Ethic of care. A feminist Philosophy of education literature review
Ethic of care: A feminist Philosophy of education literature review
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Literature Review
There are varying perceptions concerning the ethic of care and education with various scholars defining it differently (Noddings, 1984; Gilligan, 1977; Freire, 1998; Mayeroff, 1971). This section reviews the diverse definitions provided by the different scholars through their different works. In addition, the researcher will discuss the similarities and differences between the different definitions. The researcher will also conduct an incisive look into the divergent side of the ethic of care and education as presented by Slote (1999) and Gibbons (2007) before reaching a conclusion on the complexity of care.
Defining ethic of care and education
Noddings (1984) offers an approach to the ethics care with relation to relational ethics through the prioritization of relationships. The view presented by Noddings (1984) concedes to the position that approaches that had their foundation on justice are meant to uphold masculinity. On the other hand, Noddings (1984) believes that such approaches are authentic options to ethics of care. In the preciseness of a definition, Noddings (1984) contends that caring whose rooting rests in relatedness, receptivity and responsiveness presents a rather basic yet a favorable approach to ethics.
The understanding of Noddings’ (1984) ethics of care heavily relies on comprehending her perception of ethical caring and caring particularly. Noddings (1984) proposes that the carer has to demonstrate displacement of motivational and engrossment as the beneficiary of the care responds in a certain way to the caring (Noddings 1984). However, Noddings (1984) further contends that neither motivational displacement nor engrossment displacement can solely satisfy ethical caring. Ethical caring relies on natural caring according Noddings (1984). While distinguishing natural caring from ethical caring, Noddings (1984) argues that the former compels people to act because they want to, while the latter has people acting because they must act.
Therefore, Noddings (1984) summarily defines ethic of care as the obligatory care that one must offer regardless of whether one wants to or not, rather because one must in deliberate contributions to the promotion or diminishment of other people’s ethical ideals. In terms of the education front, ethic of care obliges one to do things right in addition to implanting an element of relation to others while acting under such obligation (Furman 2004). Vividly, Noddings (1984) implies that ethical caring bears the potential to become a more consolidated evaluative moral dilemma model than a justice ethic i.e. caring ought to be the basis for making ethical decisions.
On the other hand, Gilligan (1977) presents her feminist approach to ethic of care through criticism directed at the notion by Freud that considers men as morally developed than women. According to Gilligan (1977), Freud presented women as morally inferior and exhibiting less justice sense in addition to being under the influence of their hostility or affection feelings. Gilligan (1982) observes that there exists no gender correlation between the respective justice and care languages for men and women. According to Gilligan (1977), men have inclination to speak of justice while women speak the language of care. Gilligan (1977) claims that women have tendency to espouse ethics care that underscores responsibilities and relationships while the male sex often takes up justice ethics that emphasize on rights and rules.
In terms of education, Gilligan (1977) perceives that teachers frequently communicate to students that adults lack the time to develop strong relationships’ networks. Therefore, the message students get is that care is meant for kids, which further tends to discourage children’s relationships. There therefore is need to encourage children to be receptive to the wants and needs of others as opposed to discouraging attachment and dependency. Upon understanding the difficulty of clearly defining “ethic of care”, Gilligan (1977) provides two divergent ethics of care types. The first type defines a feminine ethic of care, which according to Gilligan (1977) is a relational world ethic since such a world shows in a social order that is patriarchal. On the other hand, the second type fronts from a feminist perspective and starts with connection that is theorized as primary and perceived as essential in human life (Gilligan 1977).
Mayeroff (1971) refers to caring as the act of assisting another person to grow in the direction of self-actualization. Additionally, Mayeroff (1971) implies that caring appears grounded in how worthy the caregiver perceives in the recipient of care and simultaneously enhances the self-actualization of the caregiver. Therefore, in spite of the caring purpose being to assist somebody else to grow, caring also grounds the giver of care in basic certainty according to Hawk and Lyons (2008). Therefore, Mayeroff (1971) relates ethic of care to the primary caring pattern in the sense of helping others to grow by perceiving another as one’s extension, independent and needy of growing (Hamington 2004).
Freire (1998) perceives connections in human beings with natural relations and consequently champions ethics of care that advocate for human aspiration that is universal. Additionally, Freire (1998) terms such ethics as “ethics of solidarity” (p.116). Monchiski (2010) contends that the ethical outlook that Freire (1998) fronts is essentially relational since he recognizes that all of us are in a world together. Moreover, our interconnectedness creates the inevitable need for struggle in the quest to be more human in a kind of species-level project (Monchiski, 2010). According to Freire (1998) lack of ethics and immorality is found in they that want to sustain an order that is unjust. Freire (1998) argues that letting concrete misery situations to remain persistent is actually immoral. Therefore, human beings have to act in order to change the world (1998) since the dream of humanization requires that human beings acts towards its realization (Monchiski 2010).
Nonetheless, in the education frontiers Freire (1998) perceived education as an ethical pursuit whose objective is to realize greater humanization inherently. According to Freire (1998), every education form i.e. informal, formal, institutional or non-formal have their basis in the unfinished nature of humanity. Specifically, Freire (1998, p.58) argued that it is the awareness human beings have of being unfinished that makes them educable. Moreover, Freire (1998) in the perception that education forms humans opined that education is inseparable from the formation of moral. In addition, Freire (1998) distinguished educational projects and systematic education. In systematic education, the teacher takes up superiority and the student presumes an inferior position (Monchiski 2010). However, Freire (1998) implies that educational projects differ from systematic education in the sense that their undertaking is with the oppressed in a society or school.
Similarities and differences in the definitions
The major similarity between the definitions by the various authors discussed before rest in the element of relations that they introduce in their definition of care. However, Gilligan and Noddings approach the definition of ethics of care by describing them in terms of relational ethics. However, both Noddings and Gilligan concede that approaches based on ethics that are meant to be more of masculine than feminine are authentic options to care ethics (Friedman, Robinson & Friedman, 1987). Moreover, both Gilligan and Noddings embrace the argument that ethic of care has two types in the form of feminine and feminist ethics of care. On the other hand, Mayeroff emphasizes caring as a pattern of life and Noddings presumes this as well (Cates & Lauritzen, 2001).
However, Noddings differs from Gilligan by arguing that caring which roots in relatedness, receptivity and responsiveness is a more fundamental and favorable approach to ethics. On the other hand, Gilligan contends that stages characterize the female development of moral responsibility principle that transcends hierarchically and sequentially (Baker-Ohler & Holba, 2009). The argument by Gilligan that care is a significant moral principle and an alternative to the principle of justice collides with Noddings’ perception that care and justice are gendered and inseparable. In addition, Noddings (1984) contends that the basis of caring is receptivity and a way of being (Chinn, 1991).
Mayeroff and Freire digress from gendered perspectives towards care and ethic of care as presented by Gilligan and Noddings. Nonetheless, they all consent that there is an element of human interconnection in the definition of ethic of care. The natural aspect of care that Freire (1998) presents ties closely with the argument by Noddings (1984) that care comes out naturally in human beings. On the other hand, Mayeoff (1971) perceives care in the worthiness of the recipient as seen by the giver of care while Freire (1998) contends that such care comes in the form of human aspiration. While Noddings (1984) and Gilligan (1977) present the ethic of care as obligatory and gendered, Freire (1998) and Mayeroff (1971) perceive it at a personal level i.e. as an aspiration and a quest toward self-actualization respectively.
The divergent perceptions on care and ethic of care as presented in the definitions discussed before meet a seemingly aversive context provided by Gibbons (2007). Conclusively, Gibbons (2007) perceives both education and care as social practice techniques. Moreover, Gibbons (2007) asserts that the engenderment of the seamless society results from the synthesis of education and care. Furthermore, Gibbons (2007) perceives education and care as constructs that influence the governing of our perceptions and actions towards children. To this extent, Freire’s (1998) argument appears relative to that offered by Gibbons (2007) since Freire (1998) claims that it is the human aspiration that makes humans educable. According to Gibbons (2007), there are different care experiences and meanings that consequently influence the various gendered and ethnic experiences. Moreover, such experiences and meanings are subject to normalization and regulation systems in the contexts where education and care associate.
Concerning the distinctiveness of care and education, Gibbons (2007) disputes the negligibility of distinctions between education and care. In the context, Gibbons (2007) draws in the argument that supports the incorporation of both care and education in early education. Consequently, Gibbons (2007) contends that the need for careful blending of care and education in early education insinuates the existence of a distinction between the two. This argument relates to the integration of education and morality as inseparable entities according to Freire (1998).
Another dispute as to the definitions offered by the likes of Noddings (1984) is drawn by Slote (1999). In his argument, Slote (1999) supported by Tjeltveit (2003) observes that the likes of Noddings describe care as having focus on and getting absorbed in another’s while entailing the a sensitive consideration that is particular to the needs of the other person or persons. Thus, the presentation of care in gendered justice and caring or as two types as stipulated by Noddings and Gilligan respectively is a refutable perception in the caring ethicists’ perspectives (Slote 1999). Slote (1999) contends that there is no integration of obligatory care, justice and morality within theoretical dimensions as stipulated by theorists like Gilligan and Noddings on goodness, morality, justice and care.
On the other hand, the caring morality dictates that a good person does not adhere to moral principles, standards or rules (Slote 1999). Instead, a good person has an unmediated and direct concern for the wellbeing of other people (Tjeltveit 2003). Nonetheless, Slote (1999) does not refute the possibility of valid caring morality but welcomes the idea that it implies that morality can be used as a scale through which the moral quality in the actions of people can be judged. Slote (1999) reaches the argument that the ethic of caring is representative of a criterion or standard of right. Alternatively, it represents motivation and admirable action that an individual who is moral is not believed to apply to himself or herself (Slote 1999).
Slote (1999) argues that it is necessary to contain the concerns we have for those that we love and know together with the humanitarian concern that a person who is considered to be good feels towards people generally in order for caring ethic to encompass the entirety of morality. This argument by Slote (1999) causes a convergence between Noddings’ (1984), Gilligan’s (1991) and Mayeroff’s (1971) perceptions of care ethic in the sense that it draws the aspect of care as directed to a person and to the general people at large (Hawk and Lyons, 2008). Nonetheless, the argument that Slote (1999) presents belittles the element of relationships and interconnectedness as stipulated by Gilligan, Noddings, and Freire. According to Slote (1999), it is not attitude or caring motive that adequately covers our moral appropriateness with those that we consider intimate, but the deep, genuine care that is not exclusive of anyone.
The arguments by Gibbons (2007) and Slote (1999) have different yet comparative implications on education. First of all, Gibbons (2007) brings about the element of integration of education and care. This means that education will thrive best where teachers and students exercise care. Adding to this, Slote (1999) presents a construct of social relations with genuine care through motivation and admirable action for the wellbeing of others. On the other hand, Gibbons (2007) and Slote (1999) uphold divergent perceptions towards relationships with the former advocating for them while the latter finds them less significant in the contribution towards morality in educational realms.
The digressive definitions, perceptions and arguments presented by either scholar reveals the complexity of the complexity of care. The intensity of the debate advances through the integrative acknowledgement of the aspects of relations, education, morality and aspiration. The complexity of caring provides a sturdy platform through which the education of kids can found on human relations, interconnectedness, aspiration, morality and wellbeing of others. The different constructs in care ethic enrich the different aspects of educating the kids through appreciation of care and morality in personal and collective perspectives.
Bibliography
Baker-Ohler, M., & Holba, A. (2009). Embodied care: Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and feminist ethics. Illinois, IL: University of Illinois Press.
The book offers an insight into the relationship nature that exists between care and dialogue. The authors texture and mind the human need for genuine communication in the embedded agents of human communicative. Their study approaches the care-dialogue relationship constructively within the present historical moment while basing its arguments in the traditional arguments of care as presented by various scholars. The authors posit care as a communicative philosophy and ethic that is embraceable in organizational and interpersonal communicative contexts. Moreover, the book provides an in-depth explorative approach that specifically deals with care as an ethical and philosophical paradigm in terms of living in the world.
Cates, D.F., & Lauritzen, P. (2001). Medicine and the ethics of care. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
The collection of essays presents a diverse ethicists’ group who provide feminist and religious scholarship insightful with the objective of proposing new innovative approaches to medical care ethics. They draw constructs from traditional ethics that emphasize on rules, fairness and justice in the embracement of ethics of care. The essays offer reflections on the interrelated themes of narrative, emotion and community. Moreover, the arguments presented favor the understanding of caregivers and patients alike as agents of morality whose embedment is in the numerous communities seeking the promotion of healing partially through the storytelling medium and the cultivation of good morals.
Chinn, P.L. (1991). Anthology on caring. New York, NY: National League for Nursing Press.
The chapters presented by Chinn in this book communicate the ideas, the ideals and the caring practice through a collection of different articles. The wealth introduced by the different articles banks on the divergent views presented by either article in the nursing caring phenomenon. In addition, the author presents the significance of comprehending care in the context of healthy living while exploring culture-specific care in societies that are close-knit. Furthermore, the author offers a rediscovery aspect of the necessity of social activism in promotion of care, health and nursing. The book presents insightful views on ethic of care from the different scholarly positions as argued by Noddings and Gilligan for example.
Freire, P. (1998). Pedagogy of freedom: ethics, democracy, and civic courage. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Freire approaches activism and learning as the essence of human life, arguing in the human aspiration dimension with regards to ethic of care. The author further presents an argument for the need to abolish teacher superiority and student inferiority through the acknowledgement of the questioning positions that teachers just like students find themselves in. in the book Freire disregards and blames capitalism for the sidelining of the ethical responsibility. Nevertheless, Freire appreciates that human aspirations drive human beings to being more educable. On the other hand, Freire actively proposes the opposition of a system that the human race does not believe in.
Friedman, W.J., Robinson, A.B., & Frideman, B.L. (1987). Sex differences in moral judgments? A test of Gilligan’s theory. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 11(1), 37-46.
The study aimed at testing the claim by Gilligan (1982) concerning the existent differences between men and women in relation to moral judgments. The study involved a hundred and one college students reading four traditional moral dilemmas, rating their significance of twelve considerations for deciding the protagonist response. Half of the statements were extracted from Kohlberg et al’s (1978) post-conventional moral reasoning description. The other half was derived from Gilligan’s description of the style of women in terms of moral reasoning. The results failed to establish any reliable sex differences on any of the moral reasoning types or predict individual variation in moral judgments.
Furman, G.C. (2004). The ethic of community. Journal of Educational Administration, 42(2), 215-235. doi: 10.1108/09578230410525612.
The article suggests the concept of community ethic to extend and complement other frames of ethics used in education for example justice ethics, care and critique. The ethic of community according to Furman proceeds from the traditional ethics’ definition as the study of moral obligation and duty to become the moral responsibility to participate in communal processes while educators pursue their work’s moral purposes and address the continuing daily life challenges and works within schools. The conclusion Furman reaches is that community ethic is a vehicle that has potential to synthesize most of the present work on practices of leadership that relate to social justice and other educational leadership moral purposes
Gibbons, A. (2007). Playing the Ruins: the philosophy of care in early childhood education. Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood, 8(2), 123-132. doi: 10.2304/ciec.2007.8.2.123.
The article explores the suggestion provided for the Education Ministry of Aotearoa/New Zealand implying the absence of distinction between care and education. Gibbons explores this suggestion in political and the early childhood education philosophy drawing argumentative constructs that define the distinction between education and care. In the article, Gibbons contends that the education and care conflation causes discomfort to truth regimes that governed child caring practices in the 19th and 20th centuries. Gibbons concludes that care and education are social constructs.
Gilligan, C. (1977). In a different voice: Women’s conception of the self and of morality. Harvard Educational Review, 47, 481-517.
Gilligan carries out an exploratory investigation of the limitations that are apparent in various developmental psychology theories. Predominantly, Gilligan notably criticizes Kohlberg’s moral development that defines development in terms of stages. Gilligan, through a feminist perspective concludes that Kholberg’s stages of development do not accord sufficient expression to the experiences and concerns of women. Gilligan advocates for an expanded adulthood view that would be a result of the incorporation of the “feminine voice” into the theory of development. In her advocacy, Gilligan perceives men as pursuers of justice and women as upholders of care through empathy.
Hamington, M. (2004). Embodied care: Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and feminist ethics. Illinois, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Hamington presents what he claims to be the first work that argues for the centrality of the body in terms of ethics of care. The author analyzes the corporeality of the human race at the phenomenological level. While exploring this centrality, the author conceptualizes the idea that the body of a human being is paramount to the human race morality. Moreover, the author pays specific attention to the means by which human beings come to care for each other. The author argues that the body of a human being is built to care and therefore embodiment needs to get recognition as a principal factor while considering morality. Conclusively, Hamington disputes the completeness of any morality theory that does not fully consider the body.
Hawk, T.F., & Lyons, P.R. (2008). Please don’t give up on me: When faculty fail to care. Journal of Management Education, 32(3), 316-338.
The researchers allowed students in an evening MBA class the opportunity to respond to questions concerning faculty members and the feeling of giving up on their students, what the instructor or faculty member did or failed to do for the feeling of neglect to cloud a student, the students’ reaction to that feeling and the ways in which instructors or members of the faculty can communicate to students that they have not given up on their students. The researchers further examined the responses students give in terms of pedagogical respect, ethic of care and pedagogical caring. They accompany the conclusion they reach with recommendations for the enhancement of faculty pedagogical caring.
Mayeroff, M. (1971). On caring. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
The book presents multiple philosophies of life, the meaning and significance of caring and being cared for. Mayeroff begins with the basics of morality directed towards caring and being cared for in different situations. Mayeroff presents basic morality as significant role players in the growth of an individual. Moreover, Mayeroff perceives caring as the deliberate ethic toward self-actualization of both the giver of care and the recipient of such care. However, Mayeroff appreciates the inexistence of prefect relationships and allows the room for making humanly mistakes while upholding the human capability to learn from such mistakes.
Monchiski, T. (2010). Education in hope: critical pedagogies and the ethic of care. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.
In this book, the author conducts an exploratory overview of the relationship that exists between an ethic of care and critical pedagogies. To a larger extent, the author explores the critical pedagogies presented in the perspectives of Paulo Freire and John Dewey. In order to enrich the content and present unbiased review, the author also explores the critical pedagogies of other activists and scholars in the feminist pedagogy field. In so doing, the author examines and shows a reflection of the ethic of care. Through the investigation of the relationships, the author exposes and challenges the ethical models that appear dominant and prevalent in the contemporary educational paradigms.
Noddings, N. (1984). Caring, a feminine approach to ethics & moral education. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Noddings presents the book in form of an essay in relation to practical ethics from the feminine perspective. She starts with an insightful discussion concerning caring in terms of what it means to care and be cared for taking relation as ontologically basic. On the other hand, she takes caring relation as ethically basic with a free equivocation for the giver of care and the receiver of care. Noddings strikes numerous constructs between feminine and masculine approaches to education and ethics. On moral education, Noddings explores the recommendations for schooling reorganization as illustrations of an approach, a thinking mode and a feeling concerning education, rather than as developed action plans.
Slote, M. (1999). Caring versus the philosophers. In R. Curren (ed.) Philosophy of Education 1999. Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, pp.25-35.
Slote offers equivocal perceptions and reaction on the philosophical and theoretical reactions to Noddings’ and Gilligan’s feminist and feminie approaches to care. The author takes great care to avoid bias, although he finds it difficult to adopt all their views into his work. He finds it insufficient that Noddings and Gilligan limited the caring terrain and to permit for an independent role for autonomy, rights and justice arguing that philosophical ethicists on the other hand attempt to make caring encompass the entire moral life. Slote concludes that the caring person needs to e responsible and responsive to the specificities, complexities and nuances of a bigger social and interpersonal context.
Tjeltveit, A.C. (2003). Implicit Virtues, Divergent Goods, Multiple Communities Explicitly Addressing Virtues in the Behavioral Sciences. American Behavioral Scientist, 47(4), 395-414.
The author contends that creating good theory concerning character and virtues requires encountering a major obstacle. Upon keen investigation of the ideologies, narratives, communities and practices provided by numerous behavioral scientists oppose the virtue idea, Tjeltveit points out that each one of them has notions that concern laudable human attributes. The author discusses the limitations of implicit virtue conceptions and the good. According to the article, explicit discussions of goodness, virtue and multiple communities can assist in the development of the best possible character accounts.
